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Abstract: My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding 
epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the 
same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central 
strands of Michael Williams’ diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially 
employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of 
Edward Craig’s ‘practical explication’ of the concept of knowledge so that they may be seen to 
resonate positively with Williams’s epistemological picture: the admixture of internalist and 
externalist features; the proto-contextualism; and, finally, the distinctively genealogical anti-
sceptical impetus. In this way I aim to support and augment the socialized anti-sceptical case 
mounted by Williams, and so to show that expanding epistemology in the temporal 
dimension can be a productive move in central debates in epistemology. 
1. Dimensions of Socialization 
We tend to think of the socialness of social epistemology largely in terms 
of a lateral expansion across social space. The expansion shifts the 
philosophical focus from the lone individual of so much traditional 
epistemology—the individual who wonders whether he knows this is really 
his hand before him, and so on—to his relations with his fellow subjects, 
his epistemic interactions with them, even his epistemic interdependence 
with them. The interest in epistemic interdependence brings divisions of 
epistemic labour centre-stage (as the explosion in the literature on 
testimony in recent years bears witness) and further establishes a 
recognized theoretical space for insights about how justification (for 
instance, justification for a scientific theory) can be dispersed across a 
whole epistemic community, with the consequence that it makes sense 
sometimes to regard that whole community as the subject of the 
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knowledge, and perhaps no individual at all.1 This kind of socialization of 
epistemology, then, brings with it a new, less individualistic conception of 
epistemic subjects. No longer conceived as lone individuals whose 
interactions with other individuals are epistemically incidental, we think of 
them as fundamentally, naturally, placed in relations of epistemic 
interdependence. Let us call this socialized conception of epistemic 
subjects, the Abstracted Social Conception. It marks the anti-individualist 
moment in epistemology. 
The conception is aptly labelled, for it remains highly abstracted—
appropriately for certain purposes. The social relations in which epistemic 
subjects are conceived as standing are relations between finite knowers 
and inquirers conceived as bearers of reasons, producers of evidence, 
seekers of information, conveyors of knowledge, and so on. These knowers 
and inquirers are not conceived as standing in relations of social identity 
and power. Categories of identity and power are only relevant for certain 
sorts of philosophical question, and those operating with the Abstracted 
Social Conception are not on the whole aiming to raise them. On the 
other hand, the Abstracted Social Conception doesn’t easily allow such 
questions to come into view as genuinely epistemological questions, for 
issues involving identity and power tend to appear as issues for the 
sociology of knowledge alone so long as philosophy insists upon the 
Abstracted Social Conception.  
If we want epistemology to account for the human epistemic 
predicament, then we need to have available a conception of epistemic 
subjects as required to overcome or negotiate certain entanglements of 
reason and power, because it is an essential feature of human inquirers 
that they operate in a context in which such entanglements can arise. We 
might call such a conception the Situated Social Conception, as it 
                                                     
1 For an early case for the view that justification can be dispersed in the scientific 
community, see John Hardwig, ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), 
335-349. Lynn Hankinson Nelson has argued for the view that the scientific community is 
the subject of scientific knowledge. See her Who Knows? From Quine to Feminist Empiricism 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 
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conceives epistemic subjects and their interactions as situated in a context 
of social identity and power. For any given project in social epistemology, 
then, we need to be reflective about which conception suits our 
philosophical purposes—reflective, that is, about which degree of 
abstraction is appropriate for the issues we want to bring out. Simply 
sticking to the standard Abstracted Social Conception may occlude ethical 
and political aspects of epistemic practice that are worth our attention; 
then again, attempts to embrace a Situated Social Conception may be 
pointless if relations of identity and power are irrelevant to the issue we 
are pursuing. It’s a judgement about horses for courses, so, as a matter of 
good philosophical method, we need to have the different options 
reflectively available to the philosophical imagination. The picture of 
epistemic subjects presented by the Situated Social Conception is less 
abstracted than that presented in the Abstracted Social Conception, but it 
is still an abstraction, as befits the philosophical purpose. It represents 
epistemic subjects not in their personal detail but as variously instantiating 
one or another (perhaps complex) social type. If the Abstracted Social 
Conception marks the moment of rebellion against excessive 
individualism in epistemology, the Situated Social Conception marks the 
moment of rebellion against excessive rational idealization. 
I have argued elsewhere for the importance of the Situated Social 
Conception for certain philosophical purposes, and in particular I have 
argued that there are issues of justice and injustice in our everyday 
epistemic interactions—our testimonial interactions and our practices of 
social interpretation—which cannot come to light unless we adopt that 
more fully socialized conception.2 For present purposes, however, the 
Abstracted Social Conception is appropriate, as my aim is to show how 
expanding not only across social space but also across time can be a 
powerful epistemological resource. We should distinguish between two 
sorts of temporal expansion: expansion across real time (including 
historical time), and expansion across the quasi-fictional time that is at 
                                                     
2 See my Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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work in genealogical method. I shall make a case for the philosophical 
fruitfulness of expanding over genealogical time, and my specific aim will 
be to show how the genealogical method can support and augment certain 
socializing arguments against scepticism. The genealogical story I shall use 
is that given by Edward Craig in his book, Knowledge and The State of Nature 
(hence the appropriateness here of the Abstracted Social Conception, for 
in so far as there are any social types in the State of Nature, their social 
identities do not figure in the explanatory purpose that this genealogy 
aims to achieve).3  
I shall make my case by reference to Michael Williams’ diagnostic 
engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and 
Challenge model of justification. And I will develop three key aspects of 
Craig’s ‘practical explication’ of the concept of knowledge so that they may 
be seen to resonate positively with Williams’ epistemological picture: the 
admixture of internalist and externalist features (3.1); the proto-
contextualism (3.2); and, finally, the distinctively genealogical anti-
sceptical impetus (3.3). In this way I aim to support and augment the 
socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams. I also aim thereby to 
illustrate the philosophical productiveness of expanding epistemology not 
only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the 
same time vertically in the temporal dimension. 
2. Default and Challenge: Socializing Justification 
In ‘Responsibility and Reliability’4, Michael Williams explores the anti-
sceptical impetus of a certain model of justification that is found in 
                                                     
3 Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature. An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990). 
4 Michael Williams, ‘Responsibility and Reliability’, this volume, 1-26, originally delivered 
as part of a Symposium on ‘Expanding Epistemology’, APA Pacific Division Meeting, 
Spring 2007—the present paper grew out of my response as Commentator on that 
occasion. Later that year I presented a version at a conference on Social Epistemology held 
at the University of Stirling, and am grateful to all those present for their input, including 
Kathleen Lennon who responded. I also thank Ward Jones for helpful written comments 
on a penultimate draft. 
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Robert Brandom’s work under the name of Default and Challenge. It is 
an entitlement conception of justification, according to which we may 
assume our faculties are functioning correctly so long as there are no 
reasons to suspect otherwise. Williams’ paper has two aims. Firstly, he 
aims to incorporate reliabilist insights within a fundamentally 
deontological framework, where the key reliabilist insight he has in mind 
is that many accounts of knowledge incorporate exaggerated, over-
intellectualized conceptions of what it takes to be epistemically 
responsible, which simply do not square with the spontaneous and 
unreflective character of our most basic forms of knowledge, notably, 
perception. If there is to be a satisfactory responsibilism that presents a 
unified account of knowledge, it will have to avoid such intellectualism. 
And, secondly, he wants to show how such a responsibilism can, by the 
same token, deflect scepticism. The problems of intellectualism and 
sceptical challenge, he argues, have a common solution, for one and the 
same excessively internalist, mentalistic conception of justification is 
their common root. 
Williams traces a dominant internalist conception of justification back 
to Chisholm, and the model he finds in Chisholm’s writing is one in 
which justification constitutes a kind of ‘positive authorization’ which, in 
Chisholm, is linked to a foundationalist structure with error-proof 
sensory experiences at the bottom, so that the whole structure is 
designed in the foundationalist style to stave off sceptical challenge. 
Looking to Sellars’ critical analysis of this sort of view and its 
dependence on notions of the Given, Williams argues that the positive 
authorization conception seriously exaggerates what is needed to 
vindicate the idea that epistemic subjects achieve justification by acting in 
the light of epistemic rules, as opposed to merely conforming to them. We 
can achieve a picture of subjects acting in the light of normative rules, 
without being compelled to add that rules should be construed as 
imperatival in form, or that justification flows upwards in the system 
from a foundation of error-proof self-addressed ‘reports’ of experience. 
Williams continues in the Sellarsian idiom by taking up a distinction 
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Sellars makes between ‘ought-to-do’ rules, which are imperatival in form, 
and ‘ought-to-be’ rules, which are not. These so called ‘ought-to-be’ rules 
effectively set conditions of entitlement in the Default and Challenge 
mould. In Williams’ example:  
For me to see, and not merely think that I see, that there is a rabbit in the 
garden, all sorts of conditions must be met. Some concern me: I must be of 
sound mind, paying attention, capable of recognizing what is going on, and 
so forth. Others concern the object and its situation: the animal has to be a 
rabbit and not a stuffed toy, the light must be good enough to make out the 
shape of the dark patch in the middle of the lawn, and so on. If these 
conditions are not met, I won’t be in a position to see that there is a rabbit in 
the garden.5 
What Default and Challenge achieves for us is the desired admixture of 
internalist and externalist insights. In order to count as acting in the 
light of a rule (in order to count as epistemically justified) the well-
trained subject might, depending on the context, need only to be 
counterfactually sensitive to lapses in the conditions required for 
taking the deliverances of her faculties for granted. As Williams puts it, 
‘Our acceptance of an ought-to-be “rule” consists principally in our 
disposition to acknowledge the exceptions, and to respond 
appropriately’.6 In sum, the well-trained subject may take her sensory 
experiences at face value, so long as there are no reasons not to. In 
doing this she is following rules of justification, acting in the light of 
them but not self-consciously. Thus the externalist aspect of Default 
and Challenge that sets it apart from any ‘positive authorization’ 
model. Yet, if appropriately challenged, she does have a standing 
obligation to produce a justification, and if she cannot, then she is 
revealed as lacking entitlement to her belief.7 Thus the internalist 
                                                     
5 ‘Responsibility and Reliability’; 12-13. 
6 ‘Responsibility and Reliability’; 21. 
7 Note that Brandom himself is ready to go a step further in the externalist direction than 
Williams is willing to. In Articulating Reasons he embraces reliabilism’s ‘Founding Insight’ 
and allows that, for instance, an expert in distinguishing Toltec from Aztec potsherds can 
know whether a shard is one or the other even if she cannot say how she does it. Williams 
differs, and so maintains a stronger internalism in his responsibilist position. (Robert 
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aspect of Default and Challenge that qualifies Williams’ position as a 
form of responsibilism.  
Williams also argues that seeing justification as conforming to a 
Default and Challenge structure can help fend off scepticism. He invokes 
the distinction between Agrippan and Cartesian forms of sceptical 
challenge. Agrippan scepticism imposes an endless demand for further 
justifications, so that it threatens to expose either regress or circularity in 
the series of justifications we may offer, or else a plain unjustified 
assumption somewhere in our reasoning. Cartesian scepticism is 
characterized as exploiting issues of underdetermination by positing 
sceptical scenarios which he claims, for all we know, we might be in.8 
Williams’ focus, however, is on the Agrippan style sceptic, and he argues 
that the Agrippan is committed to the familiar, mentalistic and so 
excessively internalist model of justification that conceives being guided 
by norms or rules as always a matter of self-conscious obedience to self-
addressed imperatives—positive authorization. What the Default and 
Challenge model furnishes is an account of justification—entitlement—
that makes no such requirement. By contrast, what Default and 
Challenge obliges the individual subject to do is something negative: 
don’t take your experiences at face value if the default condition is 
lapsed. A subject who is entirely successful with respect to that negative 
task may well not be able to answer the Agrippan sceptic—but so much 
the worse for the sceptic. The standing obligation to come up with 
reasons when challenged only holds for challenges to which one’s 
interlocutor is entitled. Brandom, introducing the label ‘Default and 
Challenge’, puts the point like this: 
Claims such as ‘There have been black dogs’ and ‘I have ten fingers’ are ones 
to which interlocutors are treated as prima facie entitled. They are not 
                                                                                                                       
Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) Ch.3, esp. 
98-99.) 
8 This is the characterization of Cartesian scepticism that Williams has elsewhere argued to 
be the only one to furnish radical scepticism—the view that we have no justified beliefs. 
See, for instance, Problems of Knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); 73-77. 
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immune to doubt in the form of questions about entitlement, but such 
questions themselves stand in need of some sort of warrant or justification. 
Entitlement is, to begin with, a social status that a performance or 
commitment has within a community …. The model presented here has what 
might be called a default and challenge structure of entitlement.9 
The Agrippan sceptic, then, is presenting inappropriate challenges, and 
so our failure to meet those challenges signifies nothing. The sceptic is 
thus revealed as missing the point, for she tries to compel the individual 
subject to dig deeper and deeper into his individual epistemic resources, 
furnishing reason upon reason for his belief—but this is simply the 
wrong place to look for his status as justified in believing what he 
believes. The Agrippan demands to be shown a justificational stopping 
point somewhere in the depths of the individual subject, and her mistake 
is that justification is not to be found deep in the individual but rather 
on the surface of something irreducibly social, namely, the subject’s 
ability to meet the challenges properly brought in that context by others 
in the epistemic community.  
Williams focuses on the mentalistic nature and extreme internalism of 
the model of justification that both polarizes reliabilism and 
responsibilism and hands the sceptic a stick to beat us with. But I think 
we should most of all emphasize its individualism, for it is the 
individualism that underpins both the mentalistic and the extreme 
internalist character of the mistaken model of justification that Williams 
rightly diagnoses in the sceptic. Given a general assumption of epistemic 
individualism, one easily sees how it can seem natural to assume that the 
individual is the source of all justification for her belief, and that the 
place to look is (where else?) in her mental states. Thus the mentalism. 
Further, if even the subject herself cannot find a justification in her 
psychology, then how can she count as possessing a justification at all? 
Thus the extreme internalism. I think, then, that once we focus on the 
anti-sceptical energy that Default and Challenge clearly contains, we find 
                                                     
9 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); 177. 
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that energy to be derived most fundamentally from its sociality (and so, to 
relate back to the terminology I introduced earlier, from its implicit 
insistence on the Abstracted Social Conception of epistemic subjects). 
For it is the sociality that effects the crucial shift in rational obligation 
away from the lone individual and into the epistemic social body as a 
member of which the individual subject must function. It is of course 
individuals who bear the responsibility of justification for their beliefs, 
but the point is they can only live up to this responsibility in virtue of 
their participation in a social practice of proper challenge. (I alone bear 
the responsibility for paying my bills; but the question of what I owe is 
settled as a matter of social practice.) It is this social dispersal of 
justificatory labour that relieves the individual believer of the burden of 
accessing the kind of justification that the Agrippan sceptic demands.  
The Agrippan, who presses and presses for evermore justifications, is 
thus revealed as making a profound mistake at both the level of epistemic 
practice and the level of epistemology. She fails to adhere to socially 
established norms of challenge, a mistaken practice that exposes her false 
theory of justification. But what of the Cartesian sceptic? Williams thinks 
the Cartesian, whose signature is of course the sort of madcap sceptical 
scenarios we all know and love, cannot be confined in the same way, but 
only indirectly ‘by way of showing how we can legitimately set sceptical 
problems aside’.10 Why is this? If the context sensitive norms of challenge 
can reveal Agrippan challenges as mistaken, then why not Cartesian 
challenges too? Now that we have identified the sociality of Default and 
Challenge as fuelling the anti-sceptical work, is it not evident that the 
Cartesian invocation of sceptical scenarios is a style of challenge every bit 
as inappropriate as the Agrippan? The Cartesian too seems to press his 
case to the individual knowledge-claimant in a way that is not sanctioned 
by socially established norms of Default and Challenge—the demand to 
rule out that one is a brain in a vat, or whatever it may be, is obviously 
outrageous. I think this does have some bite as an argument against the 
                                                     
10 ‘Responsibility and Reliability’; 26. 
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Cartesian. He too cannot just assume that his challenges are 
appropriate—on the face of it they certainly are not. 
It remains true, however, that the Cartesian has another card up his 
sleeve that the Agrippan lacks, in as much as the Cartesian’s challenge 
plays specifically on the idea of underdetermination in order to spook us 
with the possibility that our beliefs are not justified at all, on the grounds 
that they are no more justified than the alternative ‘theories’ of the world 
cooked up in the sceptical scenarios. This means the Cartesian can be 
construed as making a challenge not necessarily to the individual knower 
in any way that violates the insights of Default and Challenge, but rather 
as making a higher level challenge in respect of what we think we 
achieve by adhering to our precious norms of appropriate challenge—
not knowledge, he exclaims, not even justified beliefs! Admittedly, then, 
revealing the Cartesian as having an excessively individualistic theory of 
justification that should be replaced by Default and Challenge still leaves 
the spooky radical sceptical possibility rather as it is, which is why other 
arguments (against ‘epistemological realism’ and for an antidote 
contextualism) need to be brought in. Nothing in Default and 
Challenge, after all, directly addresses issues of underdetermination; 
whereas, by contrast, the favourable identification of Default and 
Challenge as a rival account of justification reveals the Agrippan as 
entirely driven by the mistaken assumption that justification requires an 
individual capacity to respond to an indefinite series of challenges, 
without lapse into regress, assumption, or circularity. Even while I want 
to insist that the socializing move inherent in Default and Challenge 
does win a trick against the Cartesian sceptic, then, still it is clear that it 
cannot on its own beat the Cartesian’s hand in the way it does the 
Agrippan’s. 
Accordingly, in respect of the Cartesian challenge, Williams looks to 
the central anti-sceptical argument of Unnatural Doubts11, namely, the 
                                                     
11 Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge 37 
argument that the Cartesian sceptic is committed to epistemological 
realism and epistemological realism is false. The Cartesian sceptic’s 
challenges concern something called ‘knowledge of the external world’ 
or ‘empirical knowledge’, as if these were respectable theoretical 
categories; but they are not. They are far too internally diverse to be so 
regarded, and in fact have no more integrity than a category such as 
‘knowledge of things done on a Wednesday’. Crucially, they are too 
internally diverse in terms of the kind of justification that is required—
something we may express in terms of the Default and Challenge model 
by saying that the norms of appropriate challenge vary from context to 
context. The Cartesian sceptic may possibly go in for his peculiar style of 
challenge in the strictly ‘epistemological context’, but not in other 
contexts. To do so would, as ever, constitute a mistake at the level of 
norms of Default and Challenge governing our epistemic practice, but 
more importantly perhaps, it would be an enactment of the false piece of 
theory that is epistemological realism. The Cartesian sceptic wants to 
move from (i) discovering that, in context C, knowledge is impossible, to 
(ii) discovering (in context C) that knowledge is impossible12, but if he 
can only make that move by way of the false doctrine of epistemological 
realism—a staging-post which would effectively privilege the so-called 
‘epistemological context’ over all others—then the move is blocked and, 
qua sceptic, he is confined to the study. That is, his eccentric style of 
justificational challenge is confined to the context of inquiry that is 
peculiar to a certain style of epistemology. 
Thus Williams’ fascinating anti-sceptical case. I have so far discussed 
(and slightly elaborated) the use he makes of Default and Challenge 
against scepticism in ‘Responsibility and Reliability’; and I have recalled 
(as he does) the contextualist position he first argued for in Unnatural 
Doubts, where it functions as the antidote to the sceptic’s epistemological 
realism. My chief purpose here, however, is to make a case for the 
                                                     
12 This is how Brandom puts the issue in ‘Fighting Skepticism with Skepticism: 
Supervaluational Epistemology, Semantic Autonomy, and Natural Kind Skepticism’ in 
Facta Philosophica, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2000; 163-178. 
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expansion of our philosophical conception of epistemic subjects and 
their activities along a certain temporal dimension, namely, the 
genealogical temporal dimension. So how might a genealogy of 
knowledge help bolster and augment Williams’ anti-sceptical case? 
3. Expanding Along The Temporal Dimension—Genealogical Time 
In Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature, he gives what I’m 
calling a genealogical account of knowledge. That is, he tells a State of 
Nature story about why we have the concept of knowledge—a ‘practical 
explication’ of that concept. He envisages a minimally social epistemic 
community—an abstraction of any real human community, though one 
that non-accidentally resembles what a real early human community 
might have been like in respect of its social simplicity and its hand-to-
mouth relation to basic human needs and dangers. The basic epistemic 
needs that define the State of Nature are, first, the need for enough 
truths (and not too many falsehoods) for other sorts of basic needs—
principally survival needs—to be met. A community that survives in the 
State of Nature must operate with sufficient truths to hunt and/or forage 
for food, take care of the young, avoid predators, deal with the dead, 
and so on. That first epistemic need immediately gives rise to a second: 
the need to realize the epistemic and practical advantages of pooling 
information. Why rely only on one’s own eyes and ears when you can 
benefit from the eyes and ears of others? From where you’re standing 
you may not be able to see if the predator is coming, but your colleague 
up the tree might, and this exemplifies the fundamental practical 
pressure to stand in co-operative epistemic relations with fellow 
inquirers. Finally, this second epistemic need spontaneously gives rise to 
a third: the need to distinguish good from bad informants, so that it is 
indeed information that gets shared and not misinformation or 
disinformation. Human beings, however described, are fallible—hence 
the risk of misinformation. And human beings in the State of Nature, as 
anywhere else, operate under pressures (such as competition for 
resources) that create motivations for deception—hence the risk of 
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disinformation. Distinguishing good informants is indeed an essential 
capacity. 
This trio of fundamental epistemic needs generates a certain point of 
view for our social epistemological project: the point of view of the 
inquirer. This is notably different from the point of view normally taken 
up in epistemology, namely that of the examiner; a point of view typified 
by the epistemologist’s remove from the actual business of inquiry in 
order to debate about whether some candidate knower really qualifies.13 
The particular need to distinguish a good informant as to a given 
question whether p is a need had only by someone who doesn’t know 
whether p but wants to. Accordingly, as we construct the epistemic State 
of Nature, we find that ignorance and the desire to make it good with 
good information emerge as our basic epistemic state. In this sense, 
‘Who knows whether p?’ is our most basic epistemological question, a 
question that pre-supposes the possibility of knowledge. How far this 
broad anti-sceptical presupposition has any argumentative force 
depends upon how convincing the overall story is in terms of its 
explanatory power. In so far as the State of Nature construction provides 
a convincing explanatory story about why we have, of necessity, the 
concept of knowledge, then so far may it turn out to give genuine 
independent support to the idea that sceptical questions are parasitic on 
there being a functional epistemic practice in which knowledge is 
possessed and, in particular, shared or ‘commoned’14 in an epistemic 
community. (I shall return to this in section 3.3.)  
So how does Craig’s genealogy explain the advent of the concept of 
knowledge? We have seen that the inquirer needs to distinguish good 
informants. A good informant is someone who: (1) is likely enough in 
the context to be right about whether p, (2) is communicatively available 
and open (including sincere), and (3) bears indicator properties so that 
                                                     
13 This distinction was first made by Bernard Williams, as Craig notes. See Williams 
‘Deciding to Believe’ in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (1973); 146. 
14 This is Michael Welbourne’s term for it. See his Knowledge (Chesham, Bucks: Acumen, 
2001) especially Chapter 6. 
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you can reliably recognize that (1) and (2) are satisfied.15 In Craig’s story, 
indicator properties will be a mixed bag, but might standardly include 
properties such as having been looking in the right direction, or having 
a good track record.16 Craig’s thesis is that the constructed concept of 
the good informant constitutes the core of our actual concept of a 
knower. As we might put it, the status of being a knower starts life as the 
status of being a good informant. The two concepts are not co-extensive 
of course: there can be knowers who are not good informants, for 
instance because they lack the requisite indicator properties, or because 
the indicator properties (being only reliable) unluckily mislead on that 
occasion. But Craig’s proposal is that the functional origin of the concept 
of knowledge is to identify good informants, and thereafter the 
constraints of recognizability and communicative openness gradually 
become relaxed, as certain more sophisticated uses we come to make of 
the concept (such as referring to knowers we cannot ourselves recognize) 
pressurize it in the direction of ‘objectification’—that is, of referring to 
something that exists independently of our powers of recognition. Such 
pressures explain how we come to think of knowledge as something 
another person can possess even if we can’t recognize it, or they aren’t 
coming out with it.17 
                                                     
15 Here I paraphrase somewhat but intend to capture Craig’s conditions. For his own 
formulation, see Knowledge and the State of Nature, 85. 
16 Properties such as these bestow what Bernard Williams, in his genealogy of truthfulness 
(modelled closely on Craig’s genealogy of knowledge) calls ‘purely positional advantage’. 
See Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002); 42-43. 
17 To be precise, there are three key pressures that push the good informant’s proto-
knowledge towards the objectivized form it takes as, simply, knowledge. First, sometimes 
inquirers may not need to recognize any informant here and now, but only at some point 
in the future. Second, the inquirer may be aware that there can be good informants whose 
indicator properties he is unable to detect. And third, it may not matter to the informant 
that he himself acquires the information at all, as what may matter is simply that someone 
around here has got it. All three push the idea of knowledge in the direction of 
‘objectivization’ and away from any dependence on immediate subjective availability to the 
inquirer. 
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3.1 The Original Synthesis of Internalist and Externalist Insights 
According to Craig’s genealogy, then, we start to operate with the 
concept of knowledge, of necessity, because at the core of that concept is 
something that meets the absolutely basic epistemic need to pick out 
good informants. Now how does all this help the socializing anti-
sceptical case that Williams builds on Default and Challenge? One of the 
key anti-sceptical features of Default and Challenge is that it achieves a 
desirable combination of internalist and externalist features. I think we 
can see how this is explained and so reinforced if we look closely enough 
at epistemic practices in the State of Nature. In the first instance, the 
practice of pooling information in the State of Nature features people 
spotting others as good informants before asking them for information. 
But we can see how the basic need for good information also drives a 
modification of that practice; namely, asking candidate good informants 
the question to which we want the answer, and then, once they have 
responded, quizzing them as to their reasons. The capacity to give 
reasons for what one asserts is a supremely important indicator property, 
not discussed by Craig. The person who asserts but does not know may 
be suspiciously fuzzy on her reasons; the person who asserts what he 
knows to be false may be suspiciously unconvincing when he presents 
purported reasons for his pretend belief. The ability to satisfy this sort of 
challenge is a key indicator property of good informants. 
Being able to supply a justification when challenged is not, however, a 
necessary condition of being a good informant. Rightly not, for what 
primarily matters to the inquirer is simply that the good informant 
comes out with the truth on demand, and not that he comes out with his 
reasons as well. Given that the inquirer can spot a good informant to her 
own satisfaction, she will just take the information and not bother to quiz 
him further about his reasons. However, this basic practice established, 
we can immediately see how quickly an informant’s capacity to give 
reasons assumes importance, for it is highly desirable in a good 
informant that he be able to produce reasons when challenged, owing to 
the fact that this may be by far the best indicator property available to 
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the inquirer. The same point applies individualistically too, for inquirers 
in the State of Nature will often be relying on the deliverances of their 
own faculties, and are best construed as entitled to trust them unless they 
have some reason not to—a foggy day, a foggy memory.18 (Here we 
glimpse the nascent Default and Challenge structure of justification 
emerging.) On these occasions, a certain challenge to self is in order, 
which amounts to a demand for an after-the-fact indicator property that 
one is likely enough in the context to be right about p. The ability to 
produce a satisfying reason is the prime case of such an indicator 
property.  
The importance of this capacity to come out with reasons when 
appropriately challenged, combined with the fact that it is not one of the 
conditions of qualifying as a good informant, explains what underpins 
the desired admixture of internalist and externalist features that 
Williams aims to achieve. The picture in the State of Nature is 
fundamentally externalist—what matters is simply that good informants 
come out with the truth—but then we quickly come to see the origin of 
internalist intuitions about knowledge. On the story I am urging here, 
we agree with Craig that the good informant’s capacity to access his 
reasons is not at the core of the concept of knowledge, but, we add, it 
does feature in a layer of content that is close to core. It is not a 
peripheral feature, resulting from some historical accident in how we 
operate with the concept. The importance of the capacity to produce 
reasons in support of what one believes flows immediately from the basic 
method of identifying good informants that constitutes the core. I think 
this is a good way of substantiating the two-sided thought that it is close 
to conceptually impossible that a human being who lacked the general 
capacity to come out with reasons for her beliefs could count as a knower 
(or even a believer); but being able to come out with one’s reasons is not 
thereby required in every instance of knowledge, and so not a necessary 
condition.  
                                                     
18 See Craig, 1990; 62-3. 
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This combining of externalist and internalist features of the practice 
of justification on the part of good informants in the State of Nature 
echoes and substantiates the internalist-externalist combination we find 
in Default and Challenge. On that model of justification, the subject can 
have knowledge even if she has taken the deliverances of her faculties 
entirely at face value and cannot produce any positive reason for her 
belief. If faced with an eccentric challenge, she may only be able to assert 
that it never occurred to her to wonder; she may even be a bit thrown by 
the fact of the challenge and by her own bewildered reaction. And yet, 
according to Default and Challenge, the fact that the default did indeed 
hold is sufficient. The kind of responsibilism Williams’ arguments are 
designed to achieve, I think, is one that allows externalism vis-à-vis the 
question whether the default of entitlement holds, so that there is no 
blanket requirement that the subject be reflectively aware that it holds; 
yet internalism when it comes to the subject’s obligation to respond to 
contextually appropriate challenges. My suggestion has been that a 
responsibilism of that combinatory sort finds explanatory support in the 
genealogical approach, owing to the non-core yet close-to-core role that 
an ability to produce reasons plays in the State of Nature. 
3.2 Practical Origins of Contextualism 
What about contextualism?—a basic version of which might be 
considered part and parcel of the Default and Challenge model of 
justification.19 I suggest that this too finds an origin in the State of 
Nature. We have seen that the inquirer is looking for someone who is 
crucially likely enough in the context to be right as to whether p. This presents 
an explicitly contextualist picture of its own, according to which what it 
takes to be a good informant—what it takes to play the social role at the 
core of knowing—alters from context to context. For instance, if the 
                                                     
19 In Unnatural Doubts (1991) Williams argues for contextualism independently from 
considerations about Default and Challenge, since it pre-dates the publication of Brandom’s 
Making It Explicit (1994). I thank Alessandra Tanesini for first pointing this out to me. In the 
later book, Problems of Knowledge (2001), we see the two in combination. 
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stakes are very high, the good informant will be almost certainly right 
about p; if they are not so high, and/or if one needs to act sooner rather 
than later, she might count as likely enough to be right about p just by 
having a half-decent track record and being the only candidate good 
informant in the vicinity. The State of Nature, then, explicitly imposes 
the aspect of contextualism that Williams has elsewhere labelled 
‘economic’:  
If it is important to reach some decision, and if the costs of error are fairly 
low, or if we gain a lot by being right and lose little by being wrong, it is 
reasonable to take a relaxed attitude to justificational standards. If the costs 
of error are high, more demanding standards may be in order. The 
opportunity costs of further inquiry can also be relevant.20  
The proto-contextualism contained in the State of Nature not only 
signifies a constraint on who can be a good informant, it imposes a 
constraint on the inquirer too. If, in our imagined scenario in which the 
inquirer has already asked a candidate good informant for information, 
the informant has told her something, and she is challenging him for his 
reasons, then her challenges must be appropriately geared to the 
context. She is looking for an after-the-fact-of-utterance indicator 
property, and this means that if she were to press him for a justification 
that exceeded the contextually required level of probability, this would 
mark a dysfunction in her epistemic conduct from her own point of view 
as an inquirer. Basic practical concerns generate the context sensitive 
norms of Default and Challenge in the State of Nature, so that inquirers 
who demand reasons above and beyond those appropriate to the context 
are making a mistake at the level of the (emergent) norms of proper 
challenge. All in all, the State of Nature presents us with a range of 
practical contexts such that in some contexts the inquirer will demand 
very little by way of an informant’s likeliness of being right, whereas in 
other contexts she will demand a good deal more, according to her 
practical needs and interests. 
                                                     
20 See Problems of Knowledge (2001); 161. 
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This aspect of context is the only one we find explicitly stated in the 
formulation of our State of Nature scenario, as a condition of being a 
good informant, though the other determinants of epistemic context can 
be built in if one is so inclined. Besides the economic, Williams cites four 
other aspects of context: (1) the intelligibility of error—we cannot make 
sense of the possibility of error except against a backdrop of getting it 
right; (2) issues of methodological necessity—in order to pursue any 
question we must take some others for granted; (3) ‘dialectical’ issues—
default entitlements are lost and gained according to the ongoing 
movement of evidence; and (4) ‘situational’ issues—claiming knowledge 
commits us to the objective well-groundedness of our beliefs (either a 
default entitlement holds or it doesn’t). Taking as an example the issue 
of methodological necessity, people in the State of Nature definitively 
don’t do history, so they don’t have to set aside questions about the 
reality of time in order to do it; but they may well have to establish 
whether a certain water source is clean or not, and so they do have to set 
aside questions about the reality of the external world.  
I believe something similar can easily be said in relation to the other 
aspects of context that Williams argues for, but I do not want to set much 
store by it. I dare say an advocate of another style of contextualism could 
construct a similar support in the State of Nature for his particular brand 
of the view too. Only the contextualism we find explicit in the formulation 
of the State of Nature scenario should define the proto-contextualism we 
regard as proper to it, and that is the condition of being a good informant 
that requires her to be likely enough in the context to be right about p. My 
point is that the practical pressures that generate this proto-contextualism 
lend genealogical explanatory support to the contextualism that Williams 
embraces, even while we can see that they might also be able to support 
distinct forms of contextualism in which the ‘economic’ element was 
differently embedded. That is entirely as it should be, for the State of 
Nature scenario purports to contain only the necessary features of our 
practices. We should not hope to find anything but the core of our actual 
justificatory practices explicit in the description of the State of Nature 
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scenario, and so should not hope to extrapolate anything more than a 
generic contextualist theoretical commitment. 
3.3 The Un-Originality of Sceptical Challenge 
In this exploration of the practical pressures that generate contextualism 
in the State of Nature, we already begin to see how the genealogy of 
knowledge provides independent support for the anti-sceptical purpose 
to which Williams puts his own contextualist position. There are no 
sceptics in the State of Nature—survival requires taking some people as 
knowing things one needs to know, and that entails accepting the 
possibility of knowledge. This underpins my earlier suggestion that 
Williams’ charge against the Agrippan sceptic—that he behaves in a 
contextually inappropriate manner—does have some force of its own 
against the Cartesian sceptic. In the State of Nature, it doesn’t matter in 
which style sceptical challenges are made. The fact that any such 
challenges make demands that exceed what it takes for the informant to 
be likely enough in the context to be right about p means the sceptic will 
fail to identify good informants that are staring him in the face, and will 
lose out on knowledge as a result. This means that not only the Agrippan 
demand for ultimate justification but also the Cartesian demand that we 
meet the challenge of underdetermination can only be a mistake.21 The 
State of Nature, then, explains the commonsense idea that no one can 
basically be a sceptic. They must be inquirer first, and sceptic second; 
someone committed to the practical possibility of knowledge first, and 
committed to undermining that possibility second. This of course leaves 
room for the idea that there may yet be a context in which it is 
appropriate to mount sceptical challenges. The present argument shows 
only that there is no such context in the State of Nature. 
                                                     
21 Our genealogical story most directly undermines Cartesian scepticism characterized in the 
traditional manner as a demand for absolute certainty, for that demand is most immediately 
what the proto-contextualism generated in the State of Nature exposes as fatally misguided, 
in as much as there is no practical context where a good informant would have to be 
absolutely certain in the requisite sense of indubitability. But the present focus is on the 
more potent interpretation of the Cartesian challenge as threatening radical scepticism. 
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This accommodating thought prompts exposure of the other respect in 
which we can see the genealogy of knowledge lending independent 
support to Williams’ anti-sceptical strategy. The point of extending our 
philosophical conception over the semi-fictional time in which 
genealogical narratives are set, is that it provides an invaluable way of 
relating core features of a concept to non-core and peripheral features. I 
know of no other philosophical method that provides the opportunity to 
relate original, necessary features of a concept to less basic, more 
contingent—historically contingent—features.22 Accordingly, it delivers an 
entirely different image of concepts than that issued by the analytical 
method. The analytical ambition and attendant philosophical imagination 
generates an image of concepts as like molecules, ready for their different 
elemental components to be separated out by the philosopher acting in 
his capacity as conceptual chemist. Genealogical method, by contrast, 
brings with it an image of core and periphery, or kernel and outer 
layers—the kernel presents necessary features of the concept, and the 
outer layers increasingly contingent historical features. These layers may 
be separated out from the kernel by the philosopher acting in his capacity 
as something more like conceptual historian. The necessity of the core 
features stands or falls with how convincingly the story passes muster as a 
pure construction out of nothing but absolutely basic needs. If, however 
unwittingly, one includes a contingent feature in the State of Nature 
scenario, perhaps to suit one’s philosophical purpose, then, clearly, the 
story will lack force. No doubt every story of origins should be 
accompanied by something of a health warning, for it surely is all too easy 
to portray the State of Nature in one’s philosophically preferred image. As 
Foucault scoffingly warns us, echoing what he takes to be Nietzsche’s own 
warning about the philosopher’s fantasy of the origin:  
History is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of 
intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting 
                                                     
22 Bernard Williams exploits this facility in Truth and Truthfulness by identifying in the 
State of Nature his two fundamental virtues of truth—Accuracy and Sincerity—and then 
going on to explore their contingent historical forms and significances. 
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spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality 
of the origin.23 
But Foucault is wrong if he equates all origins stories with ahistorical 
fantasy. One of the great virtues of the State of Nature method is 
precisely its separation of features of a concept that bear the necessity of 
the origin, from features that are more or less contingent matters of 
history. And it is entirely clear that the claim of necessity is grounded not 
on anything metaphysical, but rather on something fundamentally 
practical—the practical human necessity of the materials used to construct 
the State of Nature scenario. If we find there is nothing in the posited 
original human need to pool information that strikes us as merely 
contingent—if, that is, we cannot make sense of the idea that there could 
be a recognizably human society absent this most basic form of epistemic 
co-operation—then the idea that identifying good informants comprises 
the kernel of the concept of knowledge possesses significant force. The 
relevant counter-claim that with concepts, all is history and nothing 
origin, is Quixotic prejudice.  
Craig’s State of Nature story reveals that if there is a context of 
inquiry in which sceptical challenges are appropriate, still there are 
nonesuch in the State of Nature. And from this we have drawn the 
inference that sceptics must be inquirers first and sceptics second (or, 
basically inquirers, and sceptics only superficially). This, in its own right, 
blocks the sceptic’s colonizing move from (i) discovering that, in context 
C, knowledge is impossible, to (ii) discovering (in context C) that 
knowledge is impossible. What blocks scepticism here is the genealogical 
primacy of practical, knowledge-permitting, contexts of inquiry. These 
knowledge-permitting contexts are the contexts in which the core of the 
concept of knowledge is dramatized in practices of good informing. In 
this sense, knowledge-permitting contexts figure at the core of the 
concept of knowledge; indeed they exhaust it, for there are no other 
                                                     
23 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction To 
Foucault’s Thought, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984); 80. 
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contexts in the State of Nature. Thus the possibility of knowledge is 
prior to the possibility of sceptical challenge in the special sense that can 
only be supplied by imaginatively stretching our concepts of knowledge 
and justification across genealogical time: even the sceptic cannot escape 
the cognitive functionality of the origin, for that scenario is still with us, 
at the core of what it is for us to know.  
As in Williams’ irenic anti-sceptical strategy, this may still leave some 
room for a confined practice of sceptical challenge—it is only in the 
exclusively practical contexts provided by the State of Nature that 
sceptical challenge is obviously never a proper challenge. In the real-
time practices of Default and Challenge there may possibly remain a 
context in which sceptical challenge is appropriate, so that knowledge is 
not possible in that context. But such an ‘epistemological context’, if 
there be such24, exploits only aspects of the concept of knowledge that 
are way out on the periphery. And our genealogy has exposed the 
historical contingency of merely peripheral practices, so that the sceptic 
may at any time find the locks to his study have been changed and that it 
is now being put to a different philosophical use. In this way 
genealogical time has implications for historical real time: while the 
diagnosis of the sceptical urge goes deep in philosophy, our genealogy 
of knowledge reveals that the question of the propriety of sceptical 
challenge does not go deep. It simply rests on how much nurturance we 
continue to give to the context of inquiry in which sceptical challenge is 
deemed appropriate. That is, it rests on something social within the 
philosophical community: namely, how far we continue to respond to 
sceptical challenge in the epistemological context as justified challenge, 
how long we continue to sustain something called the ‘epistemological 
context’. Perhaps only a satisfactory theoretical diagnosis can catalyze 
and justify the historical shift that would render sceptical challenges 
inappropriate in all contexts; and that is surely something to which
                                                     
24 ‘Epistemological context’ already seems too generous a category, precisely because 
there are already approaches to epistemology that pre-empt, or at least do not invite, 
sceptical challenge. 
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Williams’ arguments make a significant contribution. For my part, I have 
tried to show that the genealogical approach contributes an independent 
diagnostic strategy, which can be seen to support and augment the main 
strands of Williams’ anti-sceptical case, and also to provide its own 
distinctive style of directly anti-sceptical argument—one that affirms the 
genealogical primacy of knowledge-permitting contexts. Most generally, 
I hope to have thereby shown how social epistemology may be fruitfully 
expanded not only across social space but also across time. 
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